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Digital Platforms – The New Network Industries? 
How to regulate them?
Digitalisation is transforming all industries, including the network 
industries. It is creating a new model of industrial organisation using 
online platform as intermediaries for multisided markets. As a matter 
of fact, digital platforms display all characteristics of the traditional 
network industries: network effects, efficiency, scale, concentration, 
market power, etc.
The involvement of online platforms in the network industries 
benefits consumers by fulfilling unmet needs, often efficiently and 
at low cost. Platforms do this partly by exploiting access to existing 
network infrastructures that are often vital for national economic 
growth and wellbeing. However, if online platforms are allowed 
to sideline traditional network operators, it may mean that vital 
investment in building and maintaining the infrastructures on which 
these markets are founded becomes unsustainable in the long-term.
Another pertinent issue concerns the regulatory approach to 
platforms, as the success of online platforms is achieved, in part, 
by exploiting regulatory environments that place incumbent firms 
at a disadvantage. There is a debate as to whether platforms should 
be subject to the same regulatory obligations as traditional network 
players, and whether platforms should have access to network services 
under regulated terms.
Following the 8th Conference on Regulation of Infrastructures, 
which took place on June 20 and 21, 2019 with a particular focus on 
the key challenges of digitalisation for traditional network industries 
in the transport, telecoms, water and energy sectors, four papers were 
selected for this publication due to their topical relevance. 
This special issue opens with an introductory article by the Members 
of the Scientific Committee of the conference, Professors of the 
Florence School of Regulation, Montero and Finger, who consider 
digital platforms as the new network industries and explore the 
network effects created by platforms. 
Fuentes et al. looks at the electricity sector, which is navigating 
major disruptions that are changing the regulatory and business 
landscape. The paper addresses whether these changes would help or 
hinder electrification, taking transportation as an example.
Becchis, Postiglione and Valerio examine how platforms are giving 
rise to a series of regulatory challenges, with a focus on their legal 
definition, labour-related issues in the digital sphere and the role of 
data between privacy protection and competition.
Knieps analyses the problem of division of labour among all-IP 
broadband network providers, virtual network service providers 
and platform operators concomitant with the implementation of 
adequate governance structures.
Ducuing analyses the phenomenon, when several (contemplated) 
data sharing legal regimes appear to essentially recognise and regulate 
data as an infrastructure, although without explicit reference to 
this notion. Her research is based on three cases, namely the Open 
Data and PSI Directive, the on-going institutional discussion on the 
governance of in-vehicle data and the freshly adopted regulation of 
data in the Electricity Directive.
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Digital Platforms as the New Network Industries
Juan José Montero*, Matthias Finger**
A new type of industrial and social organisation model is rapidly emerging in the form of digital platforms in multi-sided markets. These digital 
platforms allow groups of millions and even billions of users to interact via the internet and match their respective needs by way of sophisticated 
algorithms. Network effects play a central role.
1. Direct network effects
Firstly, platforms can create larger direct network ef-fects. Traditional network industries created direct network effects by heavily investing in infrastruc-
ture to be shared by users. Network effects were driven by 
supply. They were usually limited in geographic scope to a 
country (or to a part of a country). Platforms, on the con-
trary, build network effects by pulling together demand 
and then connecting it to supply. Investment is necessary 
to aggregate demand, but not at the level of investment 
required to create and maintain infrastructure. 
Aggregation takes place at the data layer, and the low 
transaction costs in the virtual world make it possible to 
aggregate demand faster and wider than traditional players 
in the network industries. This is why platforms do not 
usually operate at a local not even at a national level, but 
they usually have a regional and even a global reach. 
Digital platforms grow larger network effects than tra-
ditional network industries. They largely outnumber tra-
ditional players in number of customers. WhatsApp has 
more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, outnumbering the 
largest telecom carrier in the world, China Mobile with 
925 million customers, and certainly the largest carriers 
based in Europe (Vodafone has 500 million users) and the 
US (Verizon has around 150 million users). 
2. Indirect network effects
Secondly, platforms create indirect network effects. Plat-
forms can connect not only large numbers of individuals 
in homogenous groups, but two different groups (two-sid-
ed markets) and more than two groups (multi-sided mar-
kets). A good example are transport platforms connecting 
passengers and different transport providers (taxis, scoot-
ers, public transit services, etc.). 
This is possible because of the reduction of transaction 
costs. Technology makes it possible to connect large and 
heterogeneous crowds, creating new and valuable ecosys-
tems.
Indirect network effects are very powerful for two differ-
ent reasons. Firstly, it is self-evident that the more groups 
can interact in a platform, the larger the scale and the 
larger the network effects are. Secondly, and this is not so 
obvious, the possibility to have very different groups in-
teracting, creates new network effects, a coordination that 
previously did not exist and that might create new value on 
top of the value created by the mere aggregation of large 
number of users.
Platforms and indirect network effects in multi-sided 
markets allow the coordination of previously fragmented 
complex systems. Actually, the creation of value by coordi-
nating different groups of users is the deepest transforma-
tion created by digital platforms in the network industries. 
Network industries often form a very complex ecosystem 
with a large number of players. The coordination of all the 
players consumes significant resources and traditionally 
has not reached efficient results. 
In complex systems as the network industries, only the 
coordination of the different players can ensure the most 
efficient outcome. Digitalisation allows infrastructure 
managers a more efficient management of the load fac-
tor by the use of predictive algorithms and the dynamic 
management of capacity in the infrastructure. But there 
are limits on the results that can be obtained individually 
by an infrastructure manager disconnected from the rest 
of players. The dynamic coordination of a complex ecosys-
tem with multiple players requires the coordination of the 
different players. This is the opportunity for a platform in 
a multi-sided market.
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3. Data network effects
Thirdly, platforms create data network effects, as ever 
larger pools of data improve algorithms thanks to ma-
chine learning technology. For example, a search engine 
improves as more users search on it; translation software 
improves as users make more and more automatic transla-
tion. The more data a platform has, the better it can play 
its role as coordinator of a complex system.
Data network effects are fundamental for the operation 
of platforms. The scale and complexity of the interactions 
in sophisticated multi-sided markets require the most effi-
cient management by the platform. Negative network ef-
fects such as congestion and poor coordination results can 
destroy a platform. Only the best predictive algorithms fed 
with large amounts of data are in the position to efficiently 
manage the massive amount of interactions among massive 
pools of users of a very different nature.
This is clearly the case of platforms in traditional network 
industries. A platform dynamically matching passengers 
and different transport service providers has to take into 
account a massive amount of input. It has to take into ac-
count the individual choices of passengers, the availability 
of supply of each transport mode, the state of traffic, etc. 
Similarly, an electricity platform will have to dynamically 
take into consideration the evolution of the different sup-
pliers of electricity (i.e. will the sun shine in two hours so 
as to generate enough electricity in the panels installed in 
the roofs of a neighborhood, or will it be necessary to rely 
on a large natural gas power plant far away from the city?) 
and the erratic demand of very different users such as busi-
nesses, homes, electric cars, etc.
Data network effects are relevant, as the more data a 
platform has, the better it will be in the position to dy-
namically coordinate complex systems thanks to predictive 
algorithms.
These three network effect reinforce each other. The more 
users, the better the algorithm, and the better the algo-
rithm, the more users and the more categories of users can 
efficiently interact through the platform. 
4. The transformative power of network effects
It is important to identify that digital network industries 
rely on network effects just as the traditional network in-
dustries. Direct, indirect and data network effects are the 
reason behind the efficiency and the competitive advan-
tage of digital platforms. Just as traditional network in-
dustries transformed the economy and the whole society 
a century ago, digital network industries are transforming 
the economy and society today.
The digital network industries rely, just as the traditional 
network industries, on standardisation and scale. Stand-
ardisation is a requirement to build scale. Telephone, rail-
way and electricity infrastructures had to be standardised 
in order to be integrated into large scale networks. In the 
same way, standardisation is necessary in order to build 
large digital networks. For instance, transportation servic-
es mediated by digital platforms have to be standardised 
as to be presented to passengers as recognisable services. 
Even the price has to be standardised in order to streamline 
transactions. Even if technology allows the personalisation 
of the services made available to the demand side, such 
personalisation  is always a pale mirror image of the rich 
and often gaudy diversity in reality, based on a profiling 
that standardises preferences according to presumed pat-
terns.
Scale is the defining attribute of network industries. 
Network effects grow as scale grows. Traditional network 
industries create scale in the supply side, by integrating 
supply into a single monopolistic infrastructure. Demand 
had to adapt to the single supplier, not always without 
opposition, as raising prices were feared. Digital network 
industries build scale as they integrate demand and then 
connect it with supply. Scale is not to be found anymore in 
a large supplier, but in a large pool of users of the platform, 
both in the demand and in the supply side. It is the size 
of the platform which creates the network effects, not the 
size of the suppliers of the underlying service (telecoms, 
transport, energy, etc.)  
These new network effects bring dramatic increases in ef-
ficiency. The transformations brought by such efficiencies 
are as powerful as the transformations brought by econ-
omies of scale thanks to industrialisation and the corre-
sponding emergence of the traditional network industries 
during the turn of the 20th century. Back then, industrial-
isation created tensions and gave rise to social movements 
by displaced farmers and artisans. Millions of workers and 
organisations are again being substituted and displaced to-
day (e.g., written and audiovisual content producers, taxi 
drivers) and millions of individuals and organisations start 
working for obscure algorithms. Social movements again 
are on the rise. 
5. Market concentration
The new network effects are leading to a new round of 
concentration and market power, this time no longer only 
at the national or regional, but now also at the global lev-
el. Growing concentration and ‘winner-take-all’-effects in 
media, telecommunications and transport platforms pose 
a fundamental challenge not only in economic, but in 
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broader social terms, as well as at political levels. At the 
same time public debate about this can actually be con-
trolled by a few gatekeepers. 
As a consequence, the concentration of economic and 
political power seems to be a reason of concern today as 
it was a century ago when the traditional network indus-
tries emerged. It took back then more than 30 years to 
understand the ultimate reasons behind the concentration 
of power, both the legitimate (scale and network effects) 
and the illegitimate ones (systematic strategy to monopo-
lise markets) and to define the legal remedies benefit from 
efficiency while ensuring the common good. It should not 
take that long to adapt the existing regulatory framework 
to the new network industries, once it is understood that 
they are not that different from the old network industries.
This is becoming urgent, as the concentration of econom-
ic and political power today is creating similar problems 
as those faced a century ago: “Corruption dominates the 
ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress […]. The people 
are demoralized; [...] The newspapers are largely subsidized 
or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, 
homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, […], 
imported pauperized labor beats down their wages, […]. 
The fruits of the toil of millions are badly stolen to build up 
colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of 
mankind; and the possessors of these, in turn, despise the 
Republic and endanger liberty.” This is not the reactionary 
and xenophobic declaration of a 21st century anti-globalist. 
This the text of an 1892 Manifesto by I. Donnelly, the 
leader of the Populist Party in the US. 
6. Parallelisms and differences
Network effects are at the center of the digital revolution. 
It is for this reason that we propose to label platforms as 
the new network industries. We believe digital platforms 
– for example, in the areas of mobility (e.g., mobility plat-
forms) - or energy (e.g., energy services platforms) consti-
tute a new type of infrastructures, albeit a digital form of 
infrastructure.
However, one should not conclude that the traditional 
and the new network industries end up being identical 
in all of their dynamics. There are relevant differences be-
tween the traditional and the new network industries, and 
even between the different digital network industries.
The main difference is that digital platforms require a 
smaller investment to create network effects than the in-
frastructure based network industries. Traditional network 
industries, and in particular railways, pushed the frontier 
of the capital markets and were behind the creation and 
growth of such relevant capitalistic institutions as corpora-
tions, banks, stock exchanges, etc. Modern infrastructure 
required a concentration of capital previously unknown. 
Digital network effects require massive capital to grow to 
global almost universal presence. As explained growing 
platforms is a business in itself, a capital intensive business. 
But the capital required to build digital platforms is far 
away from the capital to build physical infrastructure.
Another relevant difference is dynamism. Physical infra-
structure is quite static, and once it is deployed, it usual-
ly has a long life-cycle that can easily run into decades. 
Technology certainly plays a role in infrastructure, and 
improvements have taken place over the last century. But 
improvements have been incremental, not a revolution, 
and slowly implemented. Digital network industries relay 
on software that can be easily modified. Actually, platforms 
are constantly testing new features, and the response by 
users monitored and measured. New features deployed for 
limited parts of the customer are expanded to the whole 
community if successful, from small changes in color in 
the graphical interface, to new incentives for the different 
sides in the multi-sided market. In any case, it is important 
to recognise that dynamism is more relevant in the early 
stages of a new digital market, and that once a business 
model proves successful, platforms become more stable. 
This has been the case with search engines, social networks, 
etc. Actually, the short life-spans of the early internet front-
runners (Yahoo, Myspace and so many forgotten internet 
stars) has given pass to very solid position of companies 
such as Google, Facebook and Amazon, leaders for 10 or 
15 years in their segments.
The geographic scope of the traditional and the new net-
work industries is different. Infrastructure based networks 
have always tended to be limited to a set territory, often 
within the borders of a country. Large countries as the 
US or China have large networks. Some operators have 
expanded across jurisdictions, with irregular success, but 
no global players have emerged in telecommunications, 
energy and most of the transport industries. Platforms, on 
the contrary, have easily grown global. This is the case of 
multi-platforms around Google, Facebook, Amazon and 
Apple. The only limitations seems to be political, as some 
governments in large countries have blocked the expan-
sion of US-based platforms to support their own local plat-
forms, particularly in Russia and China (with a great suc-
cess in China, the most populated country in the world).
Finally, regulation is another significant difference. In-
frastructure-based networks are very heavily regulated by 
the authorities of the territories where they are deployed. 
Actually, much of the regulation has been designed in or-
der to maximise network effects: monopoly rights, access 
and interconnection obligations, etc. Digital networks are 
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subject to a very light regulation. Different reasons explain 
this fact. Firstly, deployment usually does not require the 
previous consent of the authorities in the form of licens-
es, concessions for the use of public land, etc. Secondly, 
market failures can only been identified once new services 
mature and better understood by the regulators, so it is un-
derstandable that only at this stage, once platforms start to 
mature and the downsizes of their operations become ap-
parent, regulation starts to be discussed. Thirdly, the large 
scale and multinational presence of the leading platforms 
are a challenge for national authorities. Only the very large 
countries or regional institutions such as the European 
Union have the power and reach to really subject the new 
giants to their regulations.
7. Regulating the new network industries
Needless to say at this stage that these powerful network 
effects in the new network industries require regulation. 
The network industries paradigm has proven useful to un-
derstand and regulate the traditional network industries. 
Telecommunications, transport and energy present com-
mon traits due to the relevance of network effects, the 
tendency to concentration (with economic and political 
consequences) and the relevance of these services for so-
ciety. Of course the different sectors present specificities 
derived from the technologies they use and the economic 
conditions which are specific to them. However, the net-
work industries have proven useful to define the regulatory 
conditions for the exploitation of these networks. It does 
not mean that the same regulatory conditions have been 
applied to all these industries. However, common themes 
have been identified and similar solutions have been iden-
tified for the different industries.
In the same way, it is our understanding that the network 
industries paradigm is the most useful to understanding 
and regulating digital platforms. It does not mean that the 
regulatory framework developed over decades for a com-
petitive telecommunications industry, for example, should 
be automatically extended to digital platforms. Traditional 
and new network industries are different, just as the tradi-
tional network industries were different among themselves 
and the new platforms are also different among themselves. 
But the market failures that are emerging in the new net-
work industries are too familiar for the network industries 
crowd, and in particular for the academics and practition-
ers following the telecommunications regulation debate 
over the last decades: how to reconcile vigorous competi-
tion with the efficiency derived from network effects, scale 
and concentration and, at the same time, ensure social ob-
jectives such as universal access to services under fair and 
equal terms.
Regulation should start with the recognition that plat-
forms are not the providers of the underlying goods and 
services, but they merely provide intermediation services. 
They favour the contracting between third parties, supply 
and demand. This can take various legal forms. Intermedi-
ation, in any case, is a service prone to conflicts and very 
often regulated or at least subject to codes of conduct. 
It is our proposal that the basic regulation of the digital 
platforms should be inspired by the existing regulation on 
intermediaries: transparency, fairness, redress mechanisms, 
these are basic principles that should inspire the regulation 
of the intermediation services provided by the digital plat-
forms.
But digital platforms cannot be regulated as mere tradi-
tional intermediaries. As a market is platformised, plat-
forms play a key role as organisers of the market. They are 
in the position to determine the conditions of the provi-
sion of the service (standards, prices, schedules, etc.). This 
role as superintermediaries has to be recognised and specif-
ic regulation adopted accordingly. 
For instance, as platforms are determining some of the 
conditions for the provision of the underlying service, 
they should have some liability for such services. At the 
same time, since platforms have an unbalanced power rela-
tionship with the providers making use of the platform to 
reach customers, it might be sensible to protect providers 
imposing some regulatory obligations on the platforms. 
The most exploitative instructions in the algorithms could 
be prohibited (like unrealistic expectations in terms of tim-
ing of the services or penalties in case an individual rejects 
a service). Minimum payments could be imposed on plat-
forms. Even more, platforms could be forced to provide 
insurance to such individuals in case of accident or illness. 
Regulation could be inspired by the traditional objectives 
of labor law, but without automatically extending all the 
restrictions of labor law to a business relationship which is 
different in nature. 
Finally, platforms can reach a market power that rarely is 
obtained by traditional intermediaries. Only a very limited 
number of platforms can reach the volumes to create the 
powerful network effects in each multi-sided market. In 
some markets, only one platform provides the service. This 
is very different in many traditional intermediation servic-
es, where strong competition exists among a large number 
of brokers, agents, etc. 
Different remedies are being considered for the regula-
tion of digital platforms with market power. Many of them 
are inspired by the regulation of the tradition network in-
dustries, particularly telecoms. 
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There are growing voices calling for structural remedies in 
the form of the divestiture of the most powerful platforms, 
just as AT&T was divested in 1981. We think horisontal 
separation, breaking platforms into smaller platforms pro-
viding the same service, would kill the network effects that 
create spectacular efficiencies, so it is not advised in general 
as a remedy. However, it might be analysed for some very 
particular cases, such as advertising financed platforms 
affecting pluralism and other basic public goods. On the 
contrary, the vertical separation of the roles of intermedi-
ary and provider of underlying services might be of interest 
in order to avoid very fundamental conflicts of interest and 
the extension of dominant positions from the intermedia-
tion market to the market of the provision of the interme-
diated services. Vertical unbundling in the electricity and 
railway industries are interesting precedents.
Behavioral remedies in the form of specific obligations to 
reduce barriers to entry and facilitate platform competition 
are under consideration. Multi-homing is a reality in many 
cases. Users can join more than one platform so there is 
competition between them. Multi-homing can be facili-
tated by obligations such as data portability (inspired by 
number portability in telephony). However, multi´-hom-
ing is not universal, as high costs and other barriers make 
it unfeasible in other cases. Access regulation, also called 
interoperability, has been the ultimate remedy in tradition-
al industries to ensure competition while fully benefiting 
of network effects. If the dominant platform is obliged to 
share the network effects with smaller competitors, net-
work effects are not diminished but actually increased, and 
competition can then ensure that benefits are appropriate-
ly shared across the ecosystem, making it sustainable.
In short, we think that the expertise built over a century 
of competition and regulation in the traditional network 
industries constitutes a solid basis when it comes to facing 
the challenges of the new network industries. Expertise in 
the traditional network industries provides the most solid 
knowledge of network effects, be they direct or, in the case 
of digital platforms, indirect, as well as the new data net-
work effects. Experts in network industries know how the 
network industries have been regulated in the past and can 
therefore assess how they are affected by digital platforms. 
Consequently, they can contribute to the discussion on 
how the interfaces between the traditional network indus-
tries and the digital platforms should be regulated. Finally, 
they are sensitive to public service considerations and the 
need to introduce such considerations into the regulatory 
equation of the new network industries, and which goes 
further than the regulation of network effects and market 
power.
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From the ‘iPhone effect’ to the ‘Amazon’ of Energy1  
Rolando Fuentes*, Lester C. Hunt**, Hector G. Lopez-Ruiz***, Baltasar Manzano****
Meeting climate change goals requires both the decarbonisation of the electricity sector and the electrification of much of the rest of the economy. 
However, the electricity sector is navigating major disruptions that are changing the regulatory and business landscape. We address whether these 
changes would help or hinder electrification, taking transportation as an example.
1. Introduction
Meeting climate change goals requires both the decarbonisation of the electricity sector and the electrification of much of the rest of the 
economy. However, the electricity sector is navigating ma-
jor disruptions that are changing its regulatory and busi-
ness landscape. New distributed energy resources (DERs), 
a combination of distributed generation, storage and dig-
italisation, allow households to generate, consume, shift 
and reduce their electricity consumption, largely bypassing 
traditional utilities. This paper focuses on whether these 
changes to the electricity sector will help or hinder further 
electrification, taking transportation as an example. This is 
an interesting question because electricity and transporta-
tion, both traditional sectors, are experiencing deep trans-
formations and could have an intertwined future: electric-
ity could provide the basic ‘fuel’ for transportation, while 
transportation could be the major engine for growth in 
electricity demand. 
In both industries, the combination of different but com-
plementary new technologies challenge the dominant busi-
ness model. We call this the ‘iPhone effect.’2 In the power 
sector, the combination of photovoltaic (PV) panels + bat-
teries + demand response gadgets would allow households 
to bypass utilities’ services and even disconnect from them 
altogether (Fuentes-Bracamontes, 2016; Glachant, 2019). 
In the transportation sector, the combination of sharing 
technologies + electric vehicles + automation would free 
consumers from the need to own a car (Fulton et al., 2017; 
Sprei, 2018, The Economist, 2017a).
We therefore explore whether new electricity and trans-
portation technologies together could create an even big-
ger ‘iPhone effect’, arguing that businesses in both sectors 
will eventually offer aggregated services, repackaged as sub-
scriptions, and traded on digital platforms. We also argue 
that the data created by such activities could be so valuable 
that this alone would reinforce such a move. 
2. Potential synergies in electricity and transport dis-
ruptions
This section identifies the potential synergies in 
the application of new technologies in both sectors. 
We argue that together these synergies could result 
in a supply shock with a significant impact, leading 
to lower implicit prices and a rebound in the use of 
electricity, driven by increased levels of transporta-
tion.
2.1 Killing two birds with one stone!
Batteries are the common hardware components in new 
electricity and transportation technological disruptions. 
They are necessary for households to become energy in-
dependent and for electric vehicles (EV) to be viable. As 
such, the more storage technologies improve, the more 
they enable a virtuous power-transport circle. Improving 
battery storage capacities would allow EVs to travel longer 
distances with a single charge, and would make it easier for 
more households to become independent from a utility. 
EVs can also contribute to the development of the smart 
grid by charging during off peak hours, providing back up 
power to the grid and helping to incorporate other clean, 
renewable, zero marginal cost technologies. Reducing the 
cost of batteries would be welfare enhancing since it would 
1 Based on the paper “The ‘iPhone effect’: The Impact of Dual Technological Disruption” presented at the 8th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastruc-
tures- Digital Platforms. Florence, Italy, 20-21 June, 2019
2 The iPhone was so disruptive in the telecommunications sector because, at its early stages, it bundled at least three different technologies: a telephone, 
music player, and camera together in one device.
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also reduce the total cost of providing services in the trans-
port and power sectors. This could also increase the use 
of batteries, leading to economies of scale, which would 
trigger further a virtuous circle between electricity and 
transportation services. 
2.2 Platforms, Subscriptions and Horizontal Integra-
tion
This sub-section argues that electricity and transportation 
business models would converge as a result of technologi-
cal disruptions. Having this convergence in their business 
models would likely create synergies that might eventual-
ly lead to more vehicle miles traveled and more electricity 
consumed than if the services were offered independent of 
one another. 
Electricity and transportation services could be traded on 
platforms and offered as bundled subscriptions. Since ser-
vices are intangible and heterogeneous, service providers 
need to package services in a way that establishes the deliv-
ery unit, the scope and number of actions that constitute 
a delivered service. Because of the cost structure of new 
technologies, we suggest that electricity could be traded 
in long-term fixed price schemes, such as memberships or 
contracts, in which energy services could be combined. It 
is interesting to then explore how transportation might 
also follow such a path. Mobility is highly predictable 
most of the time. During weekdays, people go to and come 
from work and school at the same times, similar to electric-
ity baseload demand. For some people, peak demand for 
transportation might be those trips that diverge from their 
usual schedules, such as visits to the dentist, or a party on 
the weekend. As such, the prices for these services could be 
based on fees for basic and premium services. Peer to peer 
mobility apps could offer subscriptions for a given number 
of scheduled trips, with unscheduled add-ons. This would 
be similar to the two-part tariffs of mobile contracts, where 
the consumer pays for a number of minutes of calling time 
per month with extras at a premium. 
In transportation, peer to peer mobility apps, like Uber or 
Lyft, already operate on digital platforms. On the electric-
ity side, DERs can transform power markets into a series 
of nested markets connected through different platforms 
as if they were multiple sided markets: a meeting place for 
a number of agents that interact through an intermediary 
or platform. The important part is that these platforms can 
create demand-side economies of scale, known as network 
externalities. Katz and Shapiro (1985) ascribe indirect net-
work externalities to any situation where complementary 
goods become more plentiful and cheaper as the number 
of users of the goods increases. Electricity and transport 
can be mutually complementary services. If the electricity 
price fell relative to the price of gasoline or diesel as a result 
of technological disruption, this would lead to an increase 
in electric mobility. If technological changes in transpor-
tation lead to an increase in electric vehicle miles traveled, 
electricity use also increase as a result. 
Coupling transportation and power services in one plat-
form could generate synergies between the two. When 
we say that electricity and transportation will be traded 
on platforms, we need to distinguish between the physical 
platforms through which electricity is delivered- the trans-
mission and distribution network- the physical network 
through which transportation is ‘consumed’- road, rail, 
etc.- and digital platforms. Contrary to physical networks, 
where after a certain point they can become congested or 
stop taking new users, digital platforms have more capacity 
as the marginal cost of adding one more user can be close 
to zero, and the fuel that is used to run these platforms, 
data, is a non-rival in consumption. Therefore, this hori-
zontal integration could leverage the sunk costs of these 
platforms and, by adding services to them, they could be 
traded with lower overheads and lower transaction costs. 
2.3 Data and predictability
Digitalisation is another common technology in the 
disruption of the electricity and transportation sectors. 
Through the use of data, digital platforms can coordinate 
multisided markets. The proposition of this sub-section is 
that the use and monetisation of these data, generated as 
a byproduct of electricity and transportation, while hav-
ing the electricity and transportation, could constitute an 
important revenue stream for firms (Foroohar, 2019, The 
Economist, 2017b). The consumption of electricity and 
transportation is highly habit dependent and therefore 
predictable. Transacting these services on digital platforms 
and via subscriptions would generate behavioral data. Such 
data could help companies predict the aggregate household 
demand for power and transportation more accurately, 
which could lead to operational costs savings. For example, 
it would be possible to link information on the time con-
sumers leave their places of work, the approximate time 
of their arrival at home, and the sequence of appliances 
they use when they arrive. This could help transport and 
electricity companies plan for capacity expansion and uti-
lisation.
2.4 Local Focus
Another consideration is the geographical aspect of 
new technologies. With more DERs being deployed, the 
boundaries between transmission-distribution and distri-
bution-commercialisation and generation are increasing-
ly blurred, as these processes would occur more often in 
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the same place, the household. On the other hand, the 
transport revolution discussed here is, in essence, an ur-
ban phenomenon (Fulton, 2017). As such, policies at the 
municipal level could gain relative preponderance on the 
development of these two sectors, while national policies 
would see their influence reduced. This would present new 
challenges for electricity companies used to national poli-
cies but increasingly subject to more municipal legislation. 
The governance of both sectors would change, involving 
a different set of stakeholders. Electricity and transport 
companies could work together on overcoming the diffi-
culties associated with the complexities of these new busi-
ness models. This would help to reduce the cost of doing 
business for both types of companies. 
2.5 How similar are the disruptions in the power and 
transport sectors?
We have argued in favor of potential synergies and shared 
challenges for electricity and transportation new technolo-
gies. However, there are also significant conceptual differ-
ences between these technologies that we cannot ignore. 
The consequences of these contradictions/inconsistencies 
might lead to some of the synergies discussed before, like 
the horizontal integration, not to come to full effect.
DERs are a move from a centralised to a distributed sys-
tem, while ride sharing apps make the reverse transition. 
DERs have the potential to shift the energy market from 
the classic centralised model of energy provision toward a 
distributed system, where households make more granu-
lar decisions. Transport is in essence a distributed system 
that would be moving towards a more ‘centralised’ system, 
through a digital network that concentrates and predicts 
decisions made by individuals through using data pro-
duced by these technologies. 
Another barrier to access the benefits of these synergies is 
that there may be other policies with conflicting objectives 
already put in place. For instance, the road system may 
not be adequately prepared for an increase in transport. 
This would be evident from any congestion of physical in-
frastructure, with all the externalities associated with that. 
3. Regulatory Implications 
We argued that through the horizontal integration of 
these two sectors in a single platform, companies would 
obtain economies of scale, lower transaction costs, and ob-
tain complementary data sets, potentially producing a re-
bound effect that could lead to increased demand for mo-
bility and electrification. Assuming that these objectives 
are not at odds with other policy objectives, like reducing 
urban congestion, if renewable sources generated electric-
ity, this could help address the aforementioned climate 
change problem.
How then can we make sure that these synergies occur? 
Should this be left entirely to markets? Does regulation 
play a role? One positive aspect for regulation could be the 
local focus of this transformation. How to regulate digital 
platforms infrastructure is an open question that would 
require innovative approaches. Local jurisdictions, rather 
than national or supranational entities, may have more 
flexibility to come up with new regulatory frameworks.
4. Conclusion
If the technological disruptions described above come 
into full effect, they would threaten the viability of the 
dominant paradigms in both the electricity and transpor-
tation industries: the utility as the means to provide elec-
tricity and the solo car ownership model. We have there-
fore attempted to consider whether the demise of these 
two paradigms point to the electrification of more sectors 
in the economy? We argued that there are potential syn-
ergies between these two disruptions, and that when they 
are put together, can create an even greater ‘iPhone effect’.
We finish with a provocation, in line with Grossman 
(1986). If the future of electricity and transport is in-
tertwined, where would one draw the line of how many 
more services to include? If horizontally integrated firms 
exist to reduce transaction costs, why not further extend 
the firms’ boundaries? When should a firm ‘produce’ and 
when should it ‘buy’? What would be the equivalent of 
‘Amazon’ in the energy sector? These are questions for fu-
ture research. 
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Regulating the Platform Economy: Problems, Challenges, 
Tools
Franco Becchis*, Monica Postiglione**, Stefano Valerio***
Platform-based organisations are assuming increasing importance in the provision of both old and new services. This paper shows how platforms are 
giving rise to a series of regulatory challenges, with a focus on their legal definition, labour-related issues in the digital sphere and the role of data 
between privacy protection and competition.
Introduction
New opportunities given by the Internet and by the evolution of connectivity technologies and devices have made it possible to bring together 
demand and supply in a wide spectrum of markets, dra-
matically reducing transaction costs and awakening assets 
that have economic potential. Furthermore, real-time 
technologies enable economic players to be constantly 
connected and active, both as consumers and suppliers 
of services, with relevant effects in terms of potential for 
growth of new business models.
The combination of technical advancements and so-
cio-economic factors led to the rise of what has been la-
belled as ‘sharing economy’, ‘collaborative economy’ or 
‘collaborative consumption’ (Botsman and Rogers 2010). 
A central role is played by the concept of a ‘platform’, in-
tended both as a digital place where demand and supply 
meet each other and as an organisational entity that super-
vises the realm of the transactions between the two sides of 
such digital markets.
Major efforts have been made to address the aspect of 
competition between old, traditional industries and new 
players such as platforms (Uber, Airbnb, etc.). However, 
existing regulation does not seem effective and sufficient to 
respond to emerging challenges. 
The aim of this paper is to show the most relevant and 
complex aspects of the platform economy, thus providing 
policymakers and stakeholders with a theoretical toolbox 
and a more general vision.
Trust 
Trust and reputation lie at the core of markets evolution, 
maturity and destruction, and public policy should never 
underestimate them.
In the domain of platforms, the main potential obstacle 
to the development of trust and safety in transactions is 
represented by a particular case of market failure, labelled 
by the economic theory as ‘information asymmetry’. 
An information asymmetry is ‘an issue in any market 
where the quality of goods would be difficult to see by an-
ything other than casual inspection’ (Akerlof 2003) and 
consists of an uneven distribution of information about 
the quality of a good between the seller of that good and 
its potential buyers. This asymmetry can sometimes lead to 
the collapse of a transaction or even of entire markets. Plat-
forms cope with this potential factor of market failure by 
adopting public peer review mechanisms, based on rating 
systems which allow both parts of a transaction to evaluate 
each other. This unveils the agents’ behaviours, prevents 
opportunistic conducts that could make markets collapse, 
and aligns demand/supply incentives. 
In the digital world, trust is also important from an an-
titrust perspective. In this case, the key concept is trust 
portability: can platform users transfer the social capital 
(in terms of trust and reputation) they accumulated on one 
platform to another platform?
Trust portability could be an important tool for lowering 
barriers to entry for new platforms, thus promoting a more 
competitive market structure. However, the advantage de-
riving from the use of a platform is often determined by 
the so-called network externalities; that is, the existence in 
the same place of a large number of potential consumers 
and suppliers searching for the opportunity to be matched 
and to transact. When a platform is characterised by a high 
level of network externalities, the cost of switching and 
leaving such a dense network is potentially too high. This 
can lead to the persistence of monopolistic markets, mak-
ing trust portability unable to generate a more competitive 
market structure.
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Microeconomics of platforms, market disruption and le-
gal aspects
A first step towards classifying different types of platforms 
should be based on understanding their economic goals 
and motivational roots. According to this approach, it is 
possible to outline the following taxonomy:
• Consumer platforms, managed on a voluntary basis by 
participants and driven by the goal to gain market power 
in buying goods and services;
• Platforms that intermediate between demand and sup-
ply, gaining a fee for each transaction and allowing parties 
access to a specific good or service;
• Platforms that offer users the possibility to interact 
without charging any fee, with the final goal of acquir-
ing data to be monetised by selling them to other service 
providers.
Platforms that intermediate have seen the largest expan-
sion in recent years, disrupting sectors such as commerce, 
mobility, travel services and accommodation.
The microeconomic foundations of platforms develop-
ment lie in two distinct features of goods and needs (a and 
b) and a peculiar market effect (c):
(a) Granularity and underutilisation of indivisible assets
(b) Pulverisation/customisation of needs
(c) Network effect.
The matching between under-utilised resources and pul-
verised needs is enabled today by technological means that 
greatly reduce the costs of searching, negotiating and exe-
cuting (that is, transaction costs) and lie at the basis of the 
success of platforms. 
The ability to abate transaction costs explains part of the 
expansion of digital markets (DMs). In fact, DMs show 
also low/zero marginal costs (COEURE 2015). This means 
that the cost of producing one more unit of a service is 
near zero from the viewpoint of a platform owner. In the 
case of Uber, for example, the cost of supplying one more 
ride is up to the driver, not the platform.
Furthermore, from the demand viewpoint, DMs are 
characterised by low price-comparison costs and high in-
spection costs (COEURE 2015). However, the latter can 
be easily reduced by the availability of peer review systems, 
which – as already seen – erase the problem of information 
asymmetry.
These features, together with the advantages deriving 
from the so-called network effects or network externalities 
that tend to characterise digital marketplaces, explain the 
ease with which DM operators like platforms disrupt tra-
ditional industries.
Such disrupting market behaviour has been challenged by 
incumbent players in legal terms on the grounds of unfair 
competition. This forced regulators to understand how to 
define platforms in order to apply the most appropriate 
competition regime, with concretely relevant consequenc-
es as in the case of Uber.
At the end of 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
refused to consider Uber as part of the family of digital mar-
kets classifying it as ‘a service in the field of transport’ rath-
er than ‘an information society service’ (EU:C:2017:981). 
Consequently, Uber was prevented from freely establishing 
its UberPOP service in the EU.
The ECJ judgment came after the Advocate General’s 
Opinion, according to which Uber offers a mixed service, 
both physical and digital. Since Uber was also deemed to 
exert a relevant amount of control over the physical part of 
its service (setting the maximum price of a ride, establish-
ing vehicles quality requisites, vetting prospective drivers), 
the company could not be qualified as a simple digital in-
termediary. 
The Uber case clearly shows that intermediation vs. ac-
tive role in service provision is the core issue of the on-
going debate on the exact nature of platforms. However, 
technology has blurred the distinction between these two 
general categories, generating uncertainty regarding how 
to correctly classify these new economic players and which 
regulatory regime should apply.
Regulation overhauling
Where should regulators start from when approach-
ing platforms? Platforms are, in a way, self-regulated and 
self-policed (McKee 2017): they impede or allow users to 
transact according to internal and self-established rules. 
Since protecting the interests of the contracting parties is 
also an interest of the host platform, incentives are aligned, 
steering towards self-regulation. Therefore, the question, 
from a public policy perspective, is whether these internal 
rules are aligned with the public interest, particularly with 
consumer protection and competition policy.
Public welfare perspective puts consumers at the centre: 
consumer interest is not only about prices, but also about 
quality, variety and innovation. Innovations that enrich 
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consumers’ possibility of choice should be fostered and ac-
companied by public regulation.
Market failures are the theoretical ground for public reg-
ulation of markets: market power, information problems, 
accessibility and fairness, public goods and externalities ac-
count for a large proportion of such failures. From this per-
spective, regulators should consider that technology shakes 
the borders of market failures and sometimes erases them, 
as in the case of information asymmetries reduced by the 
availability of public reviews on the web. This concretely 
implies that if the peer review system is able to guarantee 
the quality of the service provided through a platform, it 
will not be necessary to set new standards applying to that 
service.
As shown by the ECJ decision on Uber, regulation – par-
ticularly at the European level – has paid more attention 
to the physical dimension of platform-based services than 
to the ability of platforms to reduce transaction costs, and 
thus create value by means of digital tools. In other words, 
regulation has preferred to focus on objects instead of 
needs. However, such regulation of objects, coupled with 
licensing systems that limit the scope and size of markets, 
have advantaged incumbent players like taxi drivers. This 
creates the risk of banning platforms’ business models 
without giving adequate consideration to consumer pro-
tection issues.
Policy options
As some scholars have argued (Biber et al. 2017), the dis-
ruptive effect coming from platforms business models is 
mainly a matter of policy rather than markets. According 
to these scholars, a key concept is policy disruption, which 
Biber et al. (2017) said is due to ‘a business innovation 
threatening an incumbent industry in such a way as to cre-
ate a policy problem that the existing regulatory regime does 
not effectively manage’.
Regulators can choose among four different policy strat-
egies when it comes to making decisions about the regula-
tion of an industry affected by policy disruption:
• Block (which implies the exclusion of outsiders from 
entering the market and competing with incumbents)
• Free Pass (which not only gives outsiders the possibility 
to compete, but also exempts them from the existing reg-
ulation)
• OldReg (extending the current legal framework to out-
siders)
• NewReg (allowing outsiders to compete under a new 
regulatory framework that encompasses both outsiders and 
incumbents) (Biber et al. 2017).
Before coming to a decision, regulators should assess 
whether the existing regulatory regime can be considered 
organisationally neutral. Regulatory neutrality should be 
the default principle that allows both incumbents and out-
siders (potential competitors) to be subject to the same set 
of rules.
However, it can be held that there are some public policy 
concerns that outweigh neutrality principle. For example, 
Airbnb could be given a FreePass since it has been found 
that its activity creates welfare gains for consumers, espe-
cially in those times and places where hotels are capaci-
ty-constrained and therefore more prone to raise prices 
(Farronato and Fradkin 2018).
On the contrary, it could be noted that these new players 
create other major policy concerns that justify the adop-
tion of a new regime, sometimes with severe implications 
for platforms operations. For example, new zoning policies 
or caps could be necessary to limit Airbnb’s expansion at 
the urban level, since it has been found that an increase in 
Airbnb supply is associated with an increase in long-term 
rent and house prices, with negative effects for consumers 
of the traditional housing market (Barron et al. 2018). 
These examples show that there is no single unique and 
prescriptive answer in the type of situations we are con-
sidering. We are talking about complex phenomena that 
should be monitored in order to understand their impacts 
and develop appropriate regulatory frameworks. Banning 
the entry of newcomers is only one extreme solution from 
a long menu of tools to effectively manage the rise of plat-
forms.
Labour and platforms
Platforms also disrupt the traditional divide between em-
ployees and independent contractors. Considering them-
selves as pure middlemen that do not exert employers’ tra-
ditional prerogatives, platforms aim to transfer a big chunk 
of the market risk to service providers (platform workers) 
in order to avoid paying the costs associated with those 
risks (illness, accidents and injuries, working time fluctu-
ations). 
Platform workers have frequently tried to draw on judi-
cial decisions in order to solve problems relating to their 
working condition. Collective bargaining is another in-
stitutional tool that could effectively manage the conflict 
arising in the sphere of the so-called digital labour. Collec-
tive bargaining ‘can stabilise labour markets and equalise 
bargaining power’ between capital and labour, with the 
final result of ‘taking wages out of competition’ (Kaufman 
2003). This issue is particularly important in the case of 
platforms, since platform workers often suffer from an ev-
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ident weak position in terms of market power, which leads 
to put downward pressure on the overall level of workers’ 
remuneration. 
Giving platform workers the right to collectively bargain 
regarding their remuneration and working conditions 
could counteract the existing unbalance in market power, 
and induce platforms to reach a new level of maturity and 
compete on variables – such as innovation and qualitative 
improvement of the service − other than wage bills.
Data and regulation
The main finding from the development of markets and 
products relying on advanced forms of technological tools 
such as artificial intelligence and machine learning is the 
central role played by data in shaping the trajectories of 
expansion of old and new economies.
When talking about data in the context of the platform 
economy, the main question from an economic and regu-
latory perspective is: is the exchange of personal data for 
platforms services fair? 
According to some scholars (Sokol and Comerford 2016), 
regulators should consider data collection and processing 
mainly as a source of potential harm to consumers privacy, 
rather than a pure antitrust and competition issue. From 
this view, the fact that huge masses of data are concentrat-
ed in the hands of few economic operators with power-
ful dominant or monopolistic positions in the market is 
not necessarily a reason for concern: ‘mere possession of 
data alone therefore, even in large volume, does not secure 
competitive success – that can only be achieved through 
engineering talent, quality of service, speed of innovation, 
and attention to consumer needs’ (Sokol and Comerford 
2016).
A radically different school of thought contends that big 
data are also a potential source of harm to consumers on 
competitive and welfare grounds. According to one an-
titrust expert, Amazon – by exploiting the possibility of 
monitoring and observing its customers’ online behav-
iour – ‘is also able to tailor prices to individual consumers’ 
(Khan 2017). This would change ‘prices more than 2.5 
million times each day’ through ‘constant price fluctua-
tions’, which would ‘diminish our ability to discern pricing 
trends’ (Khan 2017). Such practices have the potential to 
extract the highest possible value from consumers’ prefer-
ences, according to a mechanism that the economic theory 
labels as ‘first-degree price discrimination’ (Khan 2017). 
In this view, big data are considered to be part of a family 
of tools used to become more and more dominant and 
maximise earnings.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) − the 
latest regulatory tool concerning data collection and pro-
cessing issued at the European Union level − seems to 
merge and reconcile these two different approaches, using 
consumers’ privacy protection as leverage to encourage 
competition in the digital environment. Article 20 of the 
GDPR defines users’ right to data portability, in the hope 
of reducing barriers to entry for new players in markets 
largely dominated by few operators. However, this right 
does not apply when personal data is being processed on 
the basis of a ‘legitimate interest’ of the service provider, 
leaving the problems of data ownership and data manage-
ment without a clear solution. 
What seems necessary is the development of a more co-
herent legislative and regulatory framework. This would 
reduce the existing degree of uncertainty regarding the 
economic and legal nature of data and would better define 
the incentives of the different actors involved in the plat-
form economy and, more generally, the digital economy.
Conclusions and regulatory agenda
It is possible to identify three main points that remain 
unresolved and shape the regulatory agenda for the near 
future.
• How to cope with the appearance of platforms poten-
tially disrupting pre-existing markets. Rather than trying 
to block the development of new, digital-based business 
models because of their disruptive impact on old indus-
tries, policymakers should elaborate adaptive regulatory 
frameworks, keeping in mind that banning the entry of a 
newcomer is an extreme decision.
• How to address the problems relating to platform work-
ers. Giving workers the right to negotiate with platforms to 
reach collective agreements could help reduce the existing 
unbalance of power between capital and labour, thus push-
ing towards a competition based on the quality of services 
instead of wages or workers’ remuneration.
• Who has the right of ownership over the data gener-
ated in the digital realm? The GDPR has tried to solve 
this issue, but it seems that further updates are required to 
better define the incentives of all the actors involved in the 
platform and digital economies.
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Network Economics of Operator Platforms1
Günter Knieps*
Disruption of traditional network industries and the emergence of operator platforms for intelligent networks provide challenging 
governance problems of contractual relationships among the actors involved. This chapter analyses the problem of division of 
labour among all-IP broadband network providers, virtual network service providers and platform operators concomitant with 
the implementation of adequate governance structures.
Smart networks and the evolution of operator plat-
forms
Innovations in information and communication tech-nologies (ICTs) have become an important engine for the strongly growing interdisciplinary research 
on multi-sided platforms and markets (Sanchez-Cartas, 
Leon, 2019). Online intermediation services encompass-
ing online e-commerce market places, online software ap-
plication stores as well as online social media are gaining 
increasing attention within the European Community. In 
this context, the goal of competition between content pro-
viders on one side and access to content by consumers on 
the other side have shifted the focus towards the guaran-
tee of non-discriminatory treatment of services operating 
on top of online platforms (Krämer, Schnurr, de Streel, 
2017). EU rules on competition, consumer protection, 
transparency obligations, and so on have focused strongly 
on online platform-based services for content industries.2 
Online intermediation services organised via online trad-
ing platforms play an intermediary function for online ex-
change of goods, services or information between sellers 
and consumers, typically without changing the items or 
information exchanged (Nielsen, Basalisco, Thelle, 2013, 
p. 7). Online platforms often emphasise their passive role 
of transmitting information without editorial input, in-
dicating the requirements of platform neutrality. Never-
theless, the responsibilities and obligations of online plat-
forms to play a more active role in managing content (such 
as banning ‘abusive behaviour’) are currently under debate 
(Chander, Krishnamurthy 2018).
The Internet of Things (IoT) poses disruptive challenges 
for conventional network industries, enabling IoT appli-
cations for physical network services based on real time, 
adaptive and location-sensitive data. Digitalisation in 
markets for network services is fundamentally disrupting 
conventional network industries; in the meantime, plat-
form-based services are becoming increasingly relevant in 
network industries (Montero, Finger, 2017). There is an 
open and ever-expanding set of physical IoT applications 
requiring operator platforms in their role as coordinators, 
aggregators and organisers of smart physical network ser-
vices. Operator platforms play an active role in the crea-
tion of new innovative markets for physical network ser-
vices. The focus of the present paper is on the governance 
of operator platforms driven by the requirements of IoT 
applications and the future role of entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making within operator platforms. New challenges 
and requirements for a variety of heterogeneous opera-
tor platforms have arisen, combining the requirements of 
physical IoT applications with complementary virtual net-
works. This enables interactive machine-to-machine com-
munication combined with complementary dimensions 
such as geo-location, sensors and (big) data processing. 
Heterogeneous virtual networks that are complementary 
for various IoT application services are based on sensor 
networks, quality of service (QoS) requirements of all-IP 
broadband networks, geo-locational awareness and big 
data collection and processing within local neighbour-
hoods (Knieps, 2017a). 
Prosumer peer-to-peer activities, as well as business-ori-
ented market activities, are organised via a variety of oper-
ator platforms in order to organise innovative markets for 
network services. 
Mobility as a service platform
Mobility as a service platform can be organised for physical 
intermodal transportation services from different provid-
ers (buses, trains, etc.). Blurring boundaries arise between 
1 Helpful comments by the participants of the 8th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures, in particular by Matthias Finger and Juan José 
Montero are gratefully acknowledged.
2 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting fairness and transparency for business 
users of online intermediation services, Brussels, 26.4. 2018, COM (2018) 238 final. In February 2019 the European Parliament and the Council reached 
an agreement on the proposed regulation (EPRS Briefing EU Legislation in Progress, April 2019) <https://epthinktank.eu/eu-legislation-in-progress/>.
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shared bus-on-demand services with flexible time schedul-
ing and routing and public transit with scheduled servic-
es. Complementary to the changing markets for physical 
transportation services, heterogeneous virtual networks for 
shared mobility services evolve based on a combination of 
mobile real-time communication, global geopositioning 
services and sensor-based data processing. App-based oper-
ator platforms are coordinating and organising the on-de-
mand provision of mobility services, which has resulted in 
the convergence of markets for taxis, private-hire vehicles 
and ride-sourcing services (Knieps, 2018). 
Networked driverless vehicle platforms 
Networked driverless vehicle platforms organise highly 
interactive networked driverless vehicle services with the 
support of high-volume location-critical big data process-
ing (edge cloud), where the function of driver responsibil-
ity is shifted to the platform operator for the transporta-
tion process. Operator platforms require big data virtual 
networks  which combine the highest QoS class in all-IP 
broadband networks with locally based data collection 
and data processing and edge cloud computation (Knieps, 
2019, pp. 175−179). 
Microgrid platforms
Microgrid platform operators organise the low-voltage 
generation and consumption of electricity with a focus on 
renewable energy. Within (low-voltage) microgrid plat-
forms, the generation, storage and consumption of elec-
tricity of different home appliances are aggregated into the 
loads of  prosumer units, irrespective of its location within 
the microgrid platform. The resulting surplus or deficit re-
sults in outside requirements of import or the exporting of 
electricity to other (neighbouring) microgrids or distribu-
tion networks. Complementary to the physical microgrid 
platforms are virtual networks that provide the ICT logis-
tics of microgrids. Low-latency requirements of data pack-
et transmission within home networks are based on QoS 
differentiated all-IP broadband networks (Knieps, 2017b). 
The governance of heterogeneous operator platforms
The disruption of conventional network industries and 
the emergence of innovative physical operator platforms 
provide challenging governance problems of contractu-
al relationships among the various actors involved. The 
question regarding proper governance arises focusing on 
the role of spot market transactions versus long-run con-
tractual relationships as well as idiosyncratic relationships. 
The problem solution competence of operator platforms 
(two-sided, multi-sided) is the entrepreneurial search for 
the required governance structures. Operator platforms 
need, as input, a combination of physical networks and 
network services with complementary (big data) virtual 
networks. The problem of division of labour among all-IP 
broadband network providers, virtual network service pro-
viders, and platform operators arises concomitant with the 
implementation of adequate governance structures.
Heterogeneous specialised providers of operator plat-
forms fulfil the role of coordinators, aggregators and or-
ganisers, resulting in shared mobility platform operators, 
networked vehicle platform operators, microgrid platform 
operators, etc. Organisational competence to combine 
physical network services with required virtual networks 
may be bundled in the hand of the platform operators to 
enable an entrepreneurial combination of the different di-
mensions of virtual networks within the virtual network 
required for the smart physical network services. The gov-
ernance problems of operator platforms are manifold, with 
different contractual relations between different actors.
Governance between all-IP network providers and vir-
tual network providers
Contractual relations between (application-blind) mul-
tipurpose all-IP networks and (application-aware) virtual 
networks for operator platforms can be based on market 
transactions and competitive market prices. A hierarchy 
of stochastic and deterministic traffic classes is required to 
fulfil the various QoS requirements of different virtual net-
work operators (Knieps 2017a).
Governance between platform operators and virtual 
network providers 
Of particular relevance for the governance of operator 
platforms is the contractual relationship to virtual network 
providers. Such a contractual relation may vary in the de-
gree of complexity from market transaction to long-term 
contracts and possible incentives for vertical integration. 
Whereas the applications of mobility apps in shared mo-
bility markets can be implemented via short-term spot 
markets, real-time adaptive organisation of import/export 
of electricity within microgrids may be best carried out via 
long-term contracts. Incentive for vertical integration be-
tween (physical) platform operators and virtual network 
providers may arise within networked driverless vehicle 
platforms due to a strong idiosyncratic kind of unverifiable 
knowledge problems between physical and virtual services. 
Governance between platform operator and partici-
pants of the platform 
Contractual relations between platform operators and 
participants of the platform (producers, prosumers, con-
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sumers) may vary depending on the design and require-
ments of heterogeneous operator platforms. Ride-sourcing 
platforms may only provide the organisational platform 
such that individual car rides are matched with the needs 
of passengers, without owning the vehicles. Alternatively, 
a shared mobility platform can also own a fleet of vehi-
cles (such as minibuses) that they own and operate in a 
centrally dispatched transportation mode. The interaction 
between users of operator platforms and platform operator 
may require related admission procedures, obligations to 
provide sensor-based metering data for billing procedure, 
shared user data for aggregator/operator activities, as well 
as liability rules for the insurance purposes of platform 
operators. Platform user conditions may also vary in their 
specifications of obligations regarding metering informa-
tion and sensor equipment within home networks, black 
box equipment for car security or IoT application equip-
ment, insurance, health conditions, etc.
Governance between platform operators and physical 
network infrastructure providers
Contractual relations between platform operator and 
physical infrastructure providers are driven by the require-
ments of intermodal market transactions of network access 
with choice of intermodal combination of shared mobility 
services, etc. Access of platform operators to physical net-
work infrastructure capacities (such as airport slots, track 
capacities) may be organised by spot markets or long-term 
contracts. Since the interoperability between network ser-
vice provision and infrastructure can be guaranteed by ad-
equate standards, the necessities for vertical integration to 
internalise idiosyncratic knowledge problems do not hold. 
Nevertheless, platform operators require   non-discrimina-
tory access to the underlying physical network infrastruc-
tures. 
Is there a need for market power regulation of opera-
tor platforms?
Competition law and antitrust policy should not only 
be applied in liberalised network service markets and the 
evolving markets for online intermediation services plat-
forms, but also in the new evolving operator platform mar-
kets. It is to be expected that operator platforms will not re-
quire a new paradigm of ex ante market power regulation. 
Although direct and indirect network externalities, as well 
as the potentials of economies of scale, are significant for 
operator platforms, they are, by their very nature, network 
service markets with many faces   of active and potential 
competition. In contrast, physical network infrastructures 
may have the characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck 
due to the absence of active and potential competition, 
and thereby possess network-specific market power. Sec-
tor-specific price-level regulation of access tariffs and ac-
counting separation is required to guarantee non-discrim-
inatory access to monopolistic bottlenecks (Knieps, Bauer, 
2016, pp. 45−48).
Undisturbed competition on the markets for network 
services can only evolve if platform operators and con-
ventional physical network service providers gain access 
to complementary physical network infrastructures at 
non-discriminatory access charges. As it turns out, intra-
modal regulation of monopolistic bottleneck infrastruc-
tures is a precondition for undisturbed intermodal plat-
form competition, which should be enabled by access 
regulation to monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures. If a 
platform operator also owns an (upstream) monopolistic 
bottleneck infrastructure, disaggregated market power reg-
ulation should also be applied, focusing on the monopolis-
tic bottleneck components. 
Platform-based security and privacy requirements
Regulatory problems on the physical side of operator 
platforms, such as liability and safety of the physical net-
work services, are to be differentiated from privacy and se-
curity issues within virtual networks. For example, within 
the physical side of transportation service markets, tech-
nical regulations for vehicle safety and social security are 
unavoidable. An increasing need for technical regulations, 
such as specifications of safety and liability regulations in 
shared mobility, ride-sourcing and networked driverless 
vehicles applications, can be identified (Fagnant, Kockel-
man 2015). 
There are many challenges regarding security and privacy 
in the IoT (Maple, 2017). Security and privacy require-
ments vary widely depending on the specific virtual net-
work required for a specific operator platform. Comple-
mentary regulations for security and compatibility reasons, 
as well as privacy and cybersecurity regulations, become 
necessary to fulfil the requirements of the physical and vir-
tual sides of operator platforms. Heterogeneous require-
ments arise for specifications of rules and regulations in 
different operator platforms on the physical side as well 
as the virtual side, depending on the details of home net-
works, shared mobility, networked driverless vehicles, etc.
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Mandating Data Sharing to Establish Data as an 
Infrastructural Resource
Charlotte Ducuing*
In 2015, the OECD proposed characterising ‘most data’ as an ‘infrastructural resource’ and accordingly laid down guidelines in 
favour of various degrees of ‘openness’ of data. Several (contemplated) data-sharing legal regimes appear to essentially recognise 
and regulate data as an infrastructure, albeit without making explicit reference to this notion. The present article discusses this 
phenomenon through a study of three such cases, namely the Open Data and PSI Directive, the on-going institutional discussion 
on the governance of in-vehicle data, and the freshly adopted regulation of data in the Electricity Directive.
1. Sharing data as a purposive infrastructure in the 
Open Data and PSI Directive 
The Directive (EU) 2019/1024 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (‘the Open Data and PSI Directive’) adopted in 2019 recasts 
Directive (EU) 2003/98 on public sector information and 
further expands the principle of re-use of information 
(otherwise called ‘documents’ or ‘data’) held by a large 
range of public authorities. The Open Data and PSI Di-
rective mainly lays down a principle of mandatory making 
available of information falling onto ‘public sector bodies’ 
for re-use (and to a lesser extent to some other regulated 
entities), for both commercial and non-commercial pur-
poses by third parties (Article 3 (1)), following the objec-
tive of ‘open data’ (Article 1 (1)). The mandatory making 
available of data for re-use – or ‘PSI regime’ − is based on 
the observation that documents produced by public bodies 
constitute ‘a vast, diverse and valuable pool of resources 
that can benefit society’ (recital 8). 
Lundqvist considered that competition law and especially 
‘[the essential facility doctrine] has [hereby] been a great 
source of inspiration […]’ (Lundqvist 2018). As part of 
competition law, the essential facility doctrine requires, on 
behalf of the dominant undertaking, an unjustified refusal 
to supply or give access to a ‘facility’ that would be ‘essen-
tial’ for the applicant to operate its activity on a derived 
market, on which the refusal may eliminate competition 
(the determination of the harm within the meaning of 
Article 102 TFEU). Additionally, where the ‘facility’ is 
protected by intellectual property rights, the refusal would 
prevent the emergence of a new product or service for 
which there is potential demand of consumers; in other 
words, of an innovation. The essential facility remedy con-
sists of imposing on the facility-holder (in other words, the 
undertaking abusing its dominant position) an obligation 
to supply under ‘FRAND’ (fair, reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory) conditions, to the benefit of the applicant. 
The PSI regime obviously departs from competition law 
in that it operates ex ante, namely before – and without − 
any harm being caused to an applicant. The essential facili-
ty ‘logic’ may yet be recognised with regard to the identifi-
cation of the regulated entities, which are regulated in their 
quality as unique creators of data produced in the course 
of their public tasks of services of general interest; namely, 
in a ‘monopolist’ way. As observed by Lundqvist, the pro-
hibition of exclusive arrangements (Chapter IV of the Di-
rective) also evidences the competition law inspiration of 
the PSI regime. In that sense, the PSI regime introduces 
the regulated entities as actors in the data economy value 
chain by turning them into providers of ‘raw’ data. The 
Open Data and PSI Directive goes far in this regard. Al-
though the Directive applies only to re-use and in principle 
not the production and original use of the data, it lays down 
the obligation for Member States to ‘encourage public sec-
tor bodies and public undertakings to produce and make 
available documents […] in accordance with the principle 
of ‘open by design and by default’’ (Article 5 (2)) namely 
introducing the ‘taste’ of re-use as from the earliest stages 
of the production and first use of the data.  
However, a major distinction with the essential facility 
doctrine regards the beneficiaries of the PSI regime and the 
rationale for their identification. The PSI regime applies 
to the benefit of all third parties, for both commercial and 
non-commercial purposes. For the beneficiaries, there is 
not even a requirement to have a pre-identified purpose. 
The PSI regime is precisely grounded in the expectation 
that third parties will ‘find new ways to use [the data] and 
create new, innovative products and services’ (recital 8). 
Data are expected to ‘contribute to […] the development 
of new applications for consumers and legal entities [and 
especially with] intelligent data use, including their pro-
cessing through artificial intelligence applications […]’ 
(recital 9). In this context, another source of inspiration 
can be identified; namely, the identification of information 
or data held by the regulated entities as an infrastructure. 
Infrastructure has been generally described as the ‘under-
lying framework of a system’ or ‘shared means to many 
ends’ (Frischmann 2012). Frischmann identified three 
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characteristics of infrastructure. Functionally, infrastruc-
ture is a resource that is used ‘as input into a wide range 
of goods and services, which many include private […], 
public […] and social goods’, otherwise referred to as the 
‘general purpose-criterion’. Secondly, the consumption of 
infrastructure is non-rivalrous to some appreciable extent. 
Thirdly, the ‘social demand for the resource for the resource 
is driven primarily by downstream productive activities 
that require the resource as input’. Core to the concept of 
infrastructure is the differentiation between two levels: the 
infrastructure level and the ‘downstream product of oth-
er goods’. However, the ‘downstream’ level should not be 
viewed as a bounded market. Rather, infrastructure is ‘used 
by many different users, with the usage evolving over time, 
as may the type of users’ (Janssen et al. 2009).
The PSI regime is demonstrably based on the ‘gener-
al-purpose’ feature of data. No specific dataset is targeted 
(except for the new chapter V ‘high-value datasets’) and 
the re-use is not limited to a specific sector or market. On 
the contrary, the expectation that data held by public bod-
ies will feed artificial intelligence applications indicates 
how broadly data are envisaged to be reusable for. In other 
words, there may potentially be many ‘downstream levels’, 
which may and/or may not be markets in the economic 
sense. Against this background, the Open Data and PSI 
Directive can be described as purposive. Data are regulat-
ed as infrastructure, based on their potential to be used as 
such in the data economy. The (mandatory) making avail-
able for re-use is precisely expected to turn data into an 
infrastructural resource. This can be generally opposed to 
a defensive regulation as infrastructure, where the resource 
recognised as such would already functionally qualify as in-
frastructure. In such a case, regulation would aim to defend 
the interests of third parties active in the downstream lev-
el, reliant on the infrastructural resource (such as with net 
neutrality regulation). The Open Data and PSI Directive 
is based on a purposive view of infrastructure, in that data 
held by regulated entities are expected to play a role as in-
frastructure for yet-to-be-created downstream activities; in 
other words, to boost innovation.
2. Data sharing to promote ‘fair competition for data’ 
in the automotive industry? 
A data-sharing regime based partly on the ‘general purpose 
criterion’ of data may also be imposed on private undertak-
ings, such as vehicle manufacturers. Because road vehicles 
have become increasingly connected devices, ‘in-vehicle 
data’, mostly held by vehicle manufacturers, have caught 
the eye of many businesses. Regulation 715/2007 already 
makes it mandatory (Article 6 (1)) for vehicle manufactur-
ers to provide ‘unrestricted and standardised access to ve-
hicle repair and maintenance information to independent 
operators’. The Commission has contemplated further data 
sharing in its Communication of 2017 ‘Building a Euro-
pean Data Economy’ and its accompanying Staff Working 
Document and then in its Communication of 2008 ‘On 
the Road to Automated Mobility’. In the latter document, 
the Commission considered that in-vehicle data ‘have an 
enormous potential to create new and personalised services 
and products, revolutionise existing business models (e.g. 
roadside assistance, vehicle insurance, vehicle repair, car 
rental, etc.) or lead to the development of new ones. Dif-
ferent economic actors are competing for such data.’ The 
Commission also noted that there is a risk of ‘centralisation 
of in-vehicle data by vehicle manufacturers’, which ‘might 
in itself not be sufficient to ensure fair and undistorted 
competition between service providers […] in the digital 
single market’. The Commission ‘intends to improve ac-
cess and reuse of mobility and vehicle data for commercial 
and non-commercial purposes’. Contrary to the TRAN 
report on C-ITS, which called for a legislative proposal, 
the Commission only envisages a non-binding recommen-
dation at that stage. Both refer to the competition for such 
data, and the TRAN report of the European Parliament 
further refers to the purpose of promoting ‘fair, non-dis-
criminatory competition on this market […]’. Similar to 
the PSI regime, the trigger for contemplating data shar-
ing (obligation) seems to be the identification of a parallel 
‘data market’ in addition to the market for vehicles, where 
the data holder – the vehicle manufacturer in the present 
case − would be a ‘monopolist’. 
In his economic analysis of the governance of in-vehicle 
data, Kerber further distinguished between two situations. 
On the one hand, vehicle manufacturers are in a position 
to reserve ‘an exclusive (“monopolisitic”) control of in-ve-
hicle data’, to the detriment of ‘independent providers of 
services within the ecosystem of connected and automated 
mobility’ (Kerber 2018). This could enable the vehicle 
manufacturer to ‘control the automotive aftermarkets and 
adjacent services leading to less competition […]’. On the 
other hand, Kerber underlined that many further stake-
holders have a legitimate interest in getting access to the 
data, ‘for new innovative services’. 
This distinction again appears to confirm the existence of 
distinct sources of inspiration for potential in-vehicle data 
sharing regime. First, data sharing would be a means of 
preventing harm being caused by vehicle manufacturers to 
operators active in the same or related markets, based on 
their monopolist access and use of data. Competition law, 
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the Commission identified more or less stringent options, 
with the most ambitious one defining a ‘specific EU data 
management model for all Member States, such as an inde-
pendent central data hub’, with the purpose being to ‘en-
sure the impartiality of market actors involved in data han-
dling’ and to ‘creat[e] a level playing field for access to data’ 
(emphasis added). The Directive did not retain this option 
and leaves the design of the ‘data management model’ up 
to the Member States, while the ‘impartiality’ of the reg-
ulated entity is identified as a regulatory objective (recital 
57). However, as an enforcement tool to ensure ‘that they 
comply with the[ir legal] requirements’, the Directive lays 
down the obligation for Member States to have the ‘parties 
responsible for the data management’ either supervised by 
competent authority or ‘authorise[d] and certify[ied]’ (Ar-
ticle 23 (4)).
Additionally, where vertically integrated ‘distribution sys-
tem operators (DSO) are involved in data management’ 
and where smart meters are implemented, more stringent 
requirements apply, copied from the independence re-
quirements applying with regard to the electricity distri-
bution function (Article 34). DSOs that are already part 
of a vertically integrated undertaking must set up a ‘com-
pliance program’ as part of and with a view to ensuring 
their independence. The ‘compliance program’ of the DSO 
sets out ‘measures taken to ensure that discriminatory con-
duct is excluded, and that observance of it is adequately 
monitored’. It includes ‘specific obligations of employees 
to meet that objective’. The measures taken, in the form 
of an annual report, shall be submitted to the regulato-
ry authority and published. It shall also be submitted to 
the internal but independent ‘compliance officer’ of the 
DSO (Article 35 (2 (d)). The Directive essentially extends 
the scope of the compliance program of vertically integrated 
DSOs to data management. Therefore, the compliance pro-
gram shall include ‘specific measures in order to exclude 
discriminatory access to data […]’ (Article 34). Finally, 
the regulatory authority is granted the new competence to 
supervise that eligible parties have genuine access to data, 
under the conditions provided by the Directive (Article 59 
(1) (t)). Strangely, ‘data management’ is not defined in the 
Directive, although it is referred to in many provisions. 
The impact assessment of the Commission defined ‘data 
management’ as ‘the processes by which data is sourced, 
validated, stored, protected and processed and by which it 
can be accessed by suppliers or customers’.
Here again, the legal regime is obviously inspired by sev-
eral sources, including by competition law and the essential 
facility doctrine. Data management operators are targeted 
as ‘data monopolists’, in the sense that they have a monop-
olist access to certain data sources (such as data produced 
especially the essential facility doctrine therein, appears 
to be a source of inspiration. By aiming to prevent certain 
harm from being caused to competition in these markets 
(ex ante approach), similarities can also be identified with 
sector-specific regulation adopted in liberalised markets in 
network industries. Second, a consideration of data as pur-
posive infrastructure can again be identified. 
However, these sources of inspiration are not explicitly 
recognised in either the Communication of the Commis-
sion or the TRAN report on C-ITS. They even seem to be 
confused behind a rather vague call for ‘fair competition 
for data’. 
3. Regulation of the data layer in the electricity sector
In 2016, the Commission proposed a directive on the 
internal market in electricity and the Electricity Directive 
was adopted in 2019. The Directive includes a harmonised 
legal framework for ‘data management’ and the access to 
such data. For the purpose of the Directive, data means 
‘data of the final customer’ and ‘include[s] metering and 
consumption data as well as data required for customer 
switching, demand response and other services’ (emphasis 
added) (Article 23 (1)), while it remains unclear what ‘oth-
er services’ are. While metering data are not defined, ‘me-
ters’ include both smart meters and conventional meters 
(Articles 19 to 22). The proposal from the Commission 
suggested harmonising the determination of the ‘eligible 
parties’, namely the beneficiaries of the legal regime. Mem-
ber States would have to specify a list of eligible parties that 
would at least include ‘customers, suppliers, transmission 
and distribution system operators, aggregators, energy ser-
vice companies, and other parties which provide energy or 
other services to customers’ (emphasis added). The text of the 
Directive as adopted did not retain this provision, while it 
does continue to refer to ‘eligible parties’ (see Articles 23, 
24 and 34). Thus, the room for manoeuvre among Mem-
ber States in transposing this provision remains unclear. 
The Member States shall ‘organise the management of 
data in order to ensure efficient data access and exchange’. 
Access to data shall be granted in a ‘non-discriminatory’ 
manner amongst the ‘eligible parties’. It shall be ‘easy and 
the relevant procedures for obtaining access to data shall 
be made publicly available’ (Article 23 (2)). With a view 
to interoperability, the Commission shall adopt, ‘by means 
of implementing acts, interoperability requirements and 
non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for access 
to data’ (Article 24 (2)). The price for accessing data shall 
be regulated by Member States, but shall in any case be 
‘reasonable and duly justified’ (Article 23 (5)).
The Directive also lays down requirements applying to 
the data management operator. The impact assessment of 
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by the meters). More precisely, the regulation of the data 
layer is manifestly inspired from ex ante specific regulation 
in the liberalised electricity sector, as evidenced, inter alia, 
by the inclusion, in the list of minimum ‘eligible parties’ 
proposed by the Commission, of operators already active 
in the sector (such as ‘suppliers, transmission and distribu-
tion system operators, aggregators’), although eventually 
not retained in the Directive. This is also confirmed by 
the concern that the data management operator – espe-
cially when being a vertically integrated DSO – could take 
advantage of being the exclusive holder of such data, for 
the conduct of his/her own business. The focus is also im-
portantly placed on the potential of smart metering data 
to provide (near) real-time information and to make the 
market more ‘contestable’ (see inter alia articles 15 (2) (d), 
17 and 20). The final customers are therein called upon to 
play a role, which is a constant concern in liberalised net-
work industries with large remaining incumbent provid-
ers. Finally, the regulatory focus on the impartiality of the 
data management operator and the extension of the legal 
regime applying to vertically integrated DSOs to the data 
management layer as functional preventive measures are 
openly adopted by analogy to the regulation of incumbent 
electricity players. Structural regulatory options were con-
templated in the Impact Assessment of the Commission, 
although they were eventually not retained. On the other 
hand, the regulation of the data layer is also expected to 
play a role in the development of innovative products and 
services, again especially thanks to smart metering data (see 
recital 55 and Article 19 and 20). The impact assessment of 
the Commission interestingly evaluated regulatory options 
for data management with regard to both objectives to ‘fa-
cilitat[e] competition’ and to ‘support[…] new services’. In 
that sense, the regulation of electricity data is again based 
on them being perceived as a purposive infrastructure, al-
beit subject to national transposition, inter alia with regard 
to the determination of ‘eligible parties’. 
Similar to what was observed with regard to in-vehicle 
data, the various sources of inspiration for data sharing ob-
ligations (and more broadly for the regulation of the data 
layer) are not explicitly recognised. Again, they seem to be 
confused, as exemplified by the call from the Commission 
for a vague ‘level playing field for access to data’, similar 
to the ‘fair competition for data’ argument in the field of 
in-vehicle data. Eventually, the distinction between the 
various rationales appears to have not been considered rel-
evant, as evidenced for instance by the ‘open list’ of eligible 
parties proposed by the Commission and to the fact that, 
ultimately, all ‘eligible parties’ would have to be treated 
equally. This will probably lead to some uncertainty in the 
transposition process. 
4. Conclusion 
The sources of inspiration for the regulation of data in 
the Open Data and PSI Directive and in the Electricity 
Directive were analysed, and the same analysis was also 
conducted with regard to the arguments put to the fore 
by EU institutions concerning the governance of in-vehi-
cle data. This shows a growing willingness to impose data 
sharing obligations based on the consideration of data as 
a purposive infrastructure − or, in other words, to foster 
innovation. However, this rationale is not openly recog-
nised, and has even been confused with other market reg-
ulation rationales behind vague calls for ‘fair competition’ 
or a ‘level playing field’ of data. I submit that more clarity 
and granularity are needed when imposing data sharing 
obligations, with a view to the fairness required in balanc-
ing the legitimate interests at stake and especially these of 
the data holders. 
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Autumn is full of transport
area events. Visit webpages of
our conferences to learn more.
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2nd Florence Maritime Forum-Port-call
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The Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures is the annual event that brings together all the Areas
of the Florence School of Regulation. The 9th edition of the Conference on the Regulation of
Infrastructures will focus on ‘Sector Coupling’ and will take place on 25-26th June 2020 in Florence.
Call for abstracts will open in November
Learn more about the 8th edition of the conference, which took place in Florence on June 20 and
21 2019 here.
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 21, issue 4, 2019 (December)
“Research and Policy Perspectives on Digital Platforms as the New Network Industries”
Presentation of the next issue
This next issue will follow up on the current one and further explore the emerging phenomenon of digital 
platforms, especially in areas where public services are affected. Besides the traditional infrastructures – such 
as communications, transport and energy – this is also the case of media, health care, education, banking and 
finance, and others more. 
As of recently, attention paid to these emerging digital platforms is exploding. Most of the related publica-
tions aim at making recommendations as to whether, and if yes, how to regulate these digital platforms in the 
interest of the consumer, the citizen, the public economy and even public values. Some of these recommenda-
tions may be drawn quite hastily, triggered by scandals and other (geo-)political considerations.
In this issue, we will take a step back and look at where we stand in terms of the more academic debate on 
digital platforms, especially on these platforms that clearly have public (service) implications. We will do so 
by exploring both the economic and the legal perspectives on digital platforms and try to derive from there 
the current state of the debate. In particular, we want to crystalise what we already know – and therefore have 
sufficient reasons to regulate – and what we don’t know yet.
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
Network Industries Quarterly is an open access journal founded in 1998 and 
directed since then by Prof. Matthias Finger. It is published jointly by the 
Chair MIR (Management of Network Industries) of EPFL, Switzerland, the 
Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation, Italy, and the Istanbul 
Center for Regulation, Turkey.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
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